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The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the Western Theological Tradition:  
Underdeveloped or Misunderstood? 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: In contemporary theological discourse, the Western doctrine of the 
Trinity, as articulated by figures like Thomas Aquinas, is often criticized on the grounds 
that it presupposes an underdeveloped theology of the Holy Spirit that denies the third 
person of the Trinity the fullness of divine personhood. This paper will show that the 
standard critiques of the Western doctrine of the Holy Spirit spring from a 
misapprehension of the term ‘person’ as it has traditionally been used to refer to the 
divine persons. By elucidating the nature of divine personhood in the course of 
interpreting Aquinas’ thought on the Trinity, the paper will throw into relief the full 
personhood of the Holy Spirit. On this basis, moreover, it will ultimately aim to 
demonstrate the unfounded nature of some of the other main critiques of Western 
Trinitarian doctrine.  
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In contemporary theological discourse, the Western doctrine of the Trinity, as 
articulated by figures like Augustine and Aquinas, is often criticized on the grounds that 
it entails an underdeveloped theology of the Holy Spirit that denies the third person of the 
Trinity the fullness of divine personhood that is enjoyed by the other two Persons.1 With 
regard to the inner life of God, or the so-called ‘immanent Trinity’, for instance, many 
have argued that the Latin doctrine fails adequately to distinguish the Spirit’s work from 
that of the other two Persons of the Godhead.2  
By construing the third Person of the Trinity as the bond between those two 
persons, this doctrine supposedly treats him as the mere means through which they co-
operate and thus fails to recognize his status as a divine person in his own right. When it 
comes to treating the ‘economic Trinity’, or the Incarnate Son’s revelation of the Triune 
God, moreover, scholars have observed that the Latin doctrine seems to absorb the 
identity of the Spirit into that of the Second Person of the Trinity, through whom the 
work of the Father is accomplished on earth.  
The purpose of this paper is to establish that such common criticisms of the 
Western doctrine of the Holy Spirit spring from a misapprehension of the term ‘person’ 
as it has traditionally been used to refer to the divine persons. By elucidating the nature of 
divine personhood in the course of interpreting Aquinas’ thought on the Trinity, the paper 
will throw into relief the full personhood of the Holy Spirit. Ultimately, moreover, it will 
provide a basis for demonstrating the unfounded nature of some of the other main 
critiques of Western Trinitarian doctrine, which will be shown to apply more accurately 
to the alternative renderings of the Trinity that have been formulated by its critics. 
By way of context, the present discussion can be helpfully framed with reference 
to Karl Rahner’s magisterial work on The Trinity, which initiated a revival of interest in 
Trinitarian theology in our time. In this work, Rahner assesses how Trinitarian theology 
has been affected by the modern rise of a concept of personhood that diverged quite 
significantly from preceding philosophical and theological tradition.3 This tradition had 
been dominated by Boethius’ definition of the person as an ‘individual substance of a 
rational nature’ (naturæ rationalis individua substantia).4 Although this definition 
certainly allows for personal distinctiveness, it nonetheless emphasizes that individual 
human beings are ultimately part of a larger class of beings that share in common the 
rational nature, which involves both an intellect that knows and a will that motivates the 
intellect to pursue knowledge.  
Thus, Boethius’ definition implies that human beings are social creatures that 
properly cultivate their individual rational capacities in the context of a community, 
which nevertheless does not limit or define their personalities, as I will show further 
below. Already, this definition found competition in the high middle ages with the 
introduction of Richard of St Victor’s idea of a person as an ‘incommunicable substance 
of a rational nature’.5 This notion of personhood laid greater emphasis on the irreducible 
individuality of human beings. In modern thought, that emphasis came to the fore in ways 
that quickly gave rise to an individualistic ideal of persons as a discrete centres of 
consciousness or wholly autonomous entities.6  
As Rahner rightly recognized, such an ideal tends to generate tri-theism when it is 
projected, if inadvertently, onto the doctrine of the Trinity, in which there is and can only 
be one centre of consciousness, one substance, or one essence.7 In response to this threat 
to the unity of God, Karl Barth among others have argued in favour of discarding the 
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language of divine personhood and have opted instead to explain the doctrine of the 
Trinity in other terms, which seemingly promise to render the notion of a divine person 
more intelligible under modern circumstances.8 Thus, Barth famously referred to the 
Persons in terms of three ‘modes of subsisting’, namely, ‘Revealer, Revelation, and 
Revealedness’.9  
This bold move of course invited charges of modalism or sabellianism, that is, the 
unorthodox belief that the three Persons are really just modes or aspects of one divine 
being, which have no distinctness in themselves. Although these charges on the part of 
Jürgen Moltmann, for example, do not seem entirely fair in that they tend to overlook the 
nuances of Barth’s position, nevertheless, they reveal the difficulties involved in 
accounting for the unity-in-distinctness of the three Persons when modern notions of 
personhood are at play.10 In this context, the only alternatives that immediately present 
themselves are tri-theism and modalism. Yet these are false alternatives that can and 
arguably must be transcended by the formulation of a more adequate conception of divine 
personhood.  
To this end, Rahner, by contrast to his earlier contemporary Barth, sought to 
preserve the idea of divine persons, first by defending it against misunderstandings, and 
especially by invoking more contextually relevant terminology to elucidate and interpret 
it for those to whom it might seem foreign.11 In this regard, Rahner admits that he is 
largely motivated by a desire to honor the Catholic magisterium’s moratorium on changes 
in the language that had long been employed to articulate the doctrine of the Triune God. 
In that sense, the reader cannot help but wonder whether he might simply have 
abandoned talk of divine personhood if he, like the Protestant Barth, had not been 
constrained by Roman authority. 
 
A Thomistic Conception of Divine Personhood 
 
Where Barth and Rahner found ways to re-cast the traditional idea of divine 
persons and a broadly Western tradition of Trinitarian thinking more generally, I will 
endeavour in what follows to rehabilitate it. To this end, I will interpret Aquinas’ account 
of divine personhood in the wider context of his Trinitarian thought. At the outset of this 
discussion, it bears acknowledging that the doctrine of the Trinity that Aquinas presents 
in his magisterial Summa Theologiae has recently become the subject of a significant 
controversy, instigated by none other than Karl Rahner.12 According to Rahner, Aquinas 
was the first major theologian to divide his discussion of the one God (de Deo uno) from 
his subsequent account of the Triune God (de Deo trino), although he admits there is 
some precedent in this regard in the work of Augustine.13 
In Rahner’s view, this division is problematic because it implies that Christianity 
is effectively a monotheist religion in which the doctrine of the Trinity constitutes a mere 
afterthought.14 As part of a wider effort to demonstrate the doctrine’s relevance to 
Christian faith and life, Rahner takes great pains—as Barth did in his own way—to 
establish the connection between the economy of salvation in Christ, that is, the 
Incarnation, and the inner life of the Triune God. Thus, he famously formulated his rule, 
according to which, ‘the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity, and the immanent 
Trinity is the economic Trinity’.15 The upshot of this rule is that knowledge of the Trinity 
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cannot be obtained by human beings apart from the Incarnation of Christ, even if it is 
attainable this way by God.  
On these grounds, Rahner concluded that the doctrine of the Trinity is and must 
be inextricably linked to faith in Christ, while the Christian faith cannot be practically 
monotheist. This contention gave rise to a wave of literature on the relationship between 
the doctrine of the Trinity and ordinary life, some of which has gone so far as to argue 
that there is no immanent Trinity without the economic Trinity, even for God. In other 
words, as one author has put it, God is who he is ‘for us’, and as such, he has no identity 
independent of his relationship to us.16 Although some of Rahner’s followers have 
advanced this claim on the assumption that doing so is the only way to maintain the link 
between Deus unus and Deus trinus—and thus the Trinity and Christian life—I will 
demonstrate below that it is precisely this link that Aquinas establishes in his account of 
the Triune God. 
Thus, I turn now to elucidate Aquinas’ understanding of the Trinity, starting with 
his discussion of the two ‘processions’ or ways of coming forth from God the Father that 
characterize the Son and Spirit, respectively.17 Whereas the Father alone is ‘innascible’, 
not begotten or produced in any way by another, the Son proceeds from the Father by 
way of knowledge or intellect, because his relationship to the Father is like that of one 
known by a knower.18 When the Father knows the Son, consequently, he is said to 
generate a thought of himself, that is, his image, or a word of self-expression.19 After all, 
God is the highest object of knowledge, such that his supreme knowledge as God can 
consist in the knowledge of none but himself. Since the Father’s knowledge of the Son is 
therefore reflexive, it can be likened to self-knowledge. Thus, the Son can conversely be 
said to know and make known the Father in the very experience of being known by him.  
On the grounds that a good withheld is not truly good, Aquinas argues that a good 
incapable of communicating itself along these lines could not be considered the highest 
good. Because the communication of goodness is an expression of love, Aquinas 
identifies love as the ultimate attribute of the Trinity in which the Father and the Son 
communicate God’s goodness to one another.20 This brings us to the role in the Godhead 
of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father and the Son not by way of intellect but 
by way of the will—or love and desire—for that which is known, namely, the Son by the 
Father, and the Father, in turn, by the Son.21  
In Aquinas’ account, the Father’s knowing of the Son and the Son’s knowing of 
the Father ultimately reflect their mutual desire to know one another, that is, God’s desire, 
consisting in the Holy Spirit, to know himself and make himself known as the highest 
good that he is. Since the Spirit is indicative of the Father’s will to make himself known 
in the Son, and the Son’s will to know and make known the Father, he is generally 
described as the ‘Love’ or the ‘Gift’ exchanged between the Father and Son.22  
In this connection, the Spirit is said to be spirated or breathed out by the Father 
and the Son (filioque), thus binding them in unity. 23 Because this spiration enacts the 
knowledge that is shared by the knower and the known, the Spirit constitutes the very life 
or indeed the Spirit of the Trinity, which consists in honoring or loving God as the 
highest good or object of devotion and adoration, which he is known to be..  
As the discussion above suggests, an appeal to the processions of the Son and 
Spirit from the Father generates an account of God who does not merely exist as God but 
also knows and names or communicates himself as God, wants to act and indeed acts like 
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God. Since it seems fitting and even essential to the nature of a truly divine or supreme 
being to operate in all these ways, the doctrine of the Trinity can be said to generate an 
account of one God who is truly worthy of the name ‘God’. Thus, Aquinas affirms that 
God is his act of understanding, such that whatever is understood by God is the very 
living or life of God. The upshot of this claim is that God always completely is what he is, 
which is to be and to know and to say and to desire and to do all that is good, or 
consistent with love, on account of the perfect correspondence between who he is, what 
he knows, what he communicates, what he wants, and what he does.24  
So much for the sharp division between accounts de Deo uno and de Deo trino—
and the allegedly insufficient emphasis on the Trinity—in Aquinas’ work. When the 
relationship between the two treatises is interpreted on its own terms, I have noted, the 
doctrine of the Trinity emerges as the condition for the possibility of affirming the reality 
of one God who is worthy of that name. That is not to say that the knowledge of the 
Trinity is attainable ‘by reason alone’, which is on some level possible in the case of 
knowledge of the one God, whose existence can be speculatively inferred on the basis of 
a need to posit a single source for all that is ‘not God’. Nevertheless, it is to suggest that a 
fully delineated account of the one God calls for an account of the Triune God, at least in 
the hindsight of his self-revelation.  
This brings us to the four different types of relation, which characterize each of 
the three Persons of the Trinity. These relations include: paternity, proper to the Father; 
procession, proper to both Son and Spirit; filiation, proper to the Son, who is generated 
by the Father; and spiration, proper to the Spirit, who proceeds from the Father and the 
Son.25 According to Aquinas, each person of the Godhead is identified and distinguished 
by its mode of relating to the others. Thus, Aquinas speaks of the persons as subsisting in 
their relations or as ‘subsistent relations’.26 For instance, the Son is the individual person 
of the Godhead he is because he proceeds from the Father and is the second source of the 
procession of the Spirit. 
By contrast to the divine relations, which are essential to the being of the divine 
persons, it is worth noting that human relations are accidental or contingent. In other 
words, they are not necessary to the identity of human beings, contrary to the contention 
of many so-called social Trinitarians. These theologians generally affirm that subsistent 
relations are common to human and divine persons, and are in fact the means through 
which human beings participate in the life of the Trinity.27 In contrast, Aquinas’ account 
suggests that while human beings depend on other human beings in many ways, are 
formed by their social situations, and require relationships to instigate the expression of 
their individual personalities and abilities, nevertheless they are “always more than the 
sum total of their relationships.”28 
That is to say, they are not defined or wholly constricted by their relations or 
social circumstances – as if a mother had no personal identity without her children, for 
instance, or those who had experienced abuse or oppression could never overcome it. 
Where the opposite claim is upheld, the ironic conclusion follows that certain classes of 
human beings are inescapably subject to the very inequalities, gender stereotypes, and 
oppressive social situations, which many social doctrines of the Trinity purport 
theoretically to transcend. As this suggests, projecting the definition of divine personhood 
onto human persons is just as problematic as assigning modern ideas about human 
personhood on to God. While human personhood can be described as analogous to or a 
 6 
mode of participation in divine personhood, as I will elaborate below, the concepts of 
human and divine personhood are not univocal.  
The reason human beings cannot be reduced or limited to their relations in the 
way of the divine persons concerns the fact that human personalities—which predispose 
human beings to relate to others—are ineluctably limited. Although the human inability 
to relate fully to others renders it largely impossible for human beings to find complete 
fulfillment in any given relationship, or in relationships overall, it has the advantage of 
rendering illegitimate any attempt inappropriately to constrict human beings in 
accordance with their relationships or communities of upbringing in some of the 
problematic ways mentioned above.  
As God is an unlimited being, by contrast, the three personalities that constitute 
his being are not subject to limitations, although they are distinct in their modes of 
relation. On account of this unlimited-ness-in-difference, the three Persons enjoy a 
capacity to relate to one another completely.29 Thus, there is nothing about the Father that 
is not known by the Son in the Spirit, and nothing that is not known by the Son about the 
Father in the Spirit. For precisely this reason, Aquinas describes the Father, Son, and 
Spirit as ‘persons’ in the fullest sense of the term.  
While the Boethian definition of personhood he has in mind here applies to both 
human beings and to God, since both are rational—or operate in accordance with intellect 
and will—the limitations of human persons and thus of the human capacity for 
relationship entail that they possess personhood in a qualified or circumscribed sense 
which is not applicable to God.30 As such, they are persons only by analogy to or 
participation in God, who is the one and only being that is strictly speaking ‘personal’ 
because the divine persons stand in the one and only relationship that exists without 
remainder.31  
Although Aquinas’ doctrine of the Trinity affirms the personal nature of God 
along these lines, it is important to stress that it does not go any further than the doctrine 
of the one or ‘simple’ God when it comes to giving access to knowledge of the essence of 
the divine being. Rather, it offers a more, indeed, the most, elaborate ‘formal’ explanation 
of the kind of being God is.32 Whereas the doctrine of divine simplicity teaches us that 
God is a kind of being who is infinite, eternal, immutable, and omnipresent—and thus 
wholly incommensurable with the objects of our knowledge, which are complex, finite, 
temporal, changeable, and local—the doctrine of the Trinity adds nothing to this account 
but an explanation of God’s ability to make himself known as such a ‘known unknown’, 
in virtue of his personal and relational nature.  
Though the doctrine of the Trinity therefore affirms to the fullest possible extent 
God’s ability to communicate himself as the simple God monotheists believe him to be, it 
is worth re-iterating that the profound coherence the doctrine consequently exhibits can 
only be perceived in retrospect of Christian revelation.33 Thus, it remains to show briefly 
how the God who lies beyond the reach of human knowledge made himself known to 
humankind in a personal form with which human beings are capable of identifying, 
namely, by assuming the form of a human person. 
At the Incarnation, Christ imparted the knowledge of the Triune God by doing 
what he always does within the Godhead: he operated in the knowledge of and with a 
view to accomplishing the Father’s good purposes.34 In the context of his human life, he 
did this by bringing his eternal knowledge of God to bear in evaluating how to engage in 
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ordinary human activities or deal with human circumstances.35 By these means, he 
expressed his Spirit (life, mind, personality, etc.) of love for the Father, that is, his desire 
to please and honour the Father in all things. Thus, Christ revealed the Trinity to 
humankind by deliberating and finding the best way to bring glory to God in every 
human situation he faced.  
In thus revealing God, however, the Incarnation did not go any further than the 
doctrines of divine simplicity or Trinity in terms of offering substantial knowledge of 
who God is. It only confirmed in practice what these doctrines establish in theory, namely, 
that God is unknowable but is capable of making himself known as such on account of 
his personal and relational nature. Indeed, the knowledge of God delivered by his Son in 
this event was mediated by the human life and work of Christ, informed by his direct 
knowledge of God the Father. In that sense, the Son’s revelation of the Father through 
efforts to express the Spirit that seeks to glorify God at all times entails nothing but the 
revelation of the Person of Christ himself. In sum, Christ at once imparts and is the 
revelation of God.  
 
An Underdeveloped Theology of the Holy Spirit? 
 
With the foregoing discussion in view, we may now return to re-consider the 
criticisms that have been levelled against the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, as it has 
traditionally been construed in Latin Christian thought. The first of these criticisms 
pertained to the ‘immanent Trinity’, in which the Spirit’s work supposedly cannot be 
distinguished very readily from that of the other two persons. Rather, he simply 
represents the bond or shared interest that motivates the other persons in their operations.  
The second criticism concerns the ‘economic Trinity’, in which the Spirit is 
allegedly absorbed into the Second Person of the Trinity, through whom the revelation of 
the Father is accomplished. In Christ’s profession, ‘I and the Father are one’36 for 
example, there is no explicit reference to the third person of the Trinity. His relevance is 
only implied in the Son’s profession of unity with the Father, which is fostered by their 
bond in the Spirit. 
Although the aforementioned criticisms carry weight when the divine persons are 
understood as distinct and autonomous subjects or centres of consciousness, the attempt I 
undertook above to interpret Aquinas’ understanding of divine personhood on its own 
terms calls the legitimacy of those criticisms into question. As I have demonstrated, 
divine personhood in the thought of Aquinas entails a distinct but unlimited ability to 
relate to other persons in the communion—for the Spirit, consequently, the Father and the 
Son.  
However, this is an ability that the Holy Spirit possesses in full. In the case of the 
Father, for instance, the Spirit’s distinct but unlimited ability to relate manifests in the 
way he serves as breath to the Father’s word, as it were, in every act whereby the Father 
expresses his desire to make himself known through the Son. Moreover, it becomes 
evident as he performs a similar function on behalf of the Son, whose every effort to 
know the Father and make him known is the product of the Spirit’s enlivening power.  
Nonetheless, critics might retort that the theology of the Holy Spirit remains 
underdeveloped in this instance, because the Spirit’s work is unintelligible without 
reference to the Father and the Son. What such critics overlook, however, is that same 
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holds true of the Father and the Son, whose work is defined in terms of their respective 
relations to the Spirit. It is only slightly more obvious in the case of the Spirit that the 
persons are highly dependent upon one another. Yet it is this very inter-dependence—or 
capacity for relation without remainder—that establishes rather than undermines the 
personhood of the Spirit, to say nothing of the other two persons, in the thought of 
Aquinas. 
In that sense, the Western doctrine provides a fully developed account of the 
Spirit’s operations precisely because it treats him as the bond, shared interest, motivator, 
or life force, behind the work of the Father and Son – not in spite of that fact. As this 
suggests, the objections to the traditional doctrine of the Holy Spirit can be refuted not so 
much by searching for new ways to address them on the assumption they are legitimate, 
but simply by explaining the terms of the doctrine itself, which render the objections 
obsolete.   
When this explanation is offered, the Spirit emerges not only as a fully endowed 
divine person but even as a divine person in the supreme sense of the term. For his 
involvement everywhere the Son acts out of a desire to glorify the Father, and the Father 
out of a desire to glorify himself in the Son, confirms that he is the means of the other 
two persons’ inter-relations. As such, he is relational in the greatest number of respects, 
and thus, supremely personal. For this reason, the Western conception of the Spirit, far 
from underdeveloped, recognizes the Spirit’s personhood in the most profound way.  
 
Social Trinitarianism: A Critique of the Critics 
 
While providing a basis for resolving complaints about the Western doctrine of 
the Holy Spirit, the discussion of the Trinity above also lays a foundation for addressing 
other common problems that have been associated with the Latin doctrine of the Trinity 
more generally. In this final section, my purpose is to demonstrate that these further 
problems do not arise for that doctrine when it is interpreted on its own terms. Rather 
ironically, they can be linked instead to the alternative model of the Trinity that has been 
formulated by those seeking to avoid precisely those problems.  
Although this model is subject to variation in the work of different thinkers, it has 
nonetheless come to be known under the general heading of ‘social Trinitarianism’. 
Typically, social Trinitarians such as Jürgen Moltmann trace their thinking to the 
tradition of Trinitarian thought that emerged in the Greek East, although recent research 
which highlights the affinities between Latin and Greek Patristic thought on the Trinity 
seems to query the accuracy of this lineage.37 With a view to offering a more developed 
doctrine of the Holy Spirit than can supposedly be found in the traditional Western 
doctrine, social Trinitarians generally reject the filioque, or the idea that the Spirit is the 
bond between the Father and Son, and present him instead as one who proceeds like the 
Son directly from the Father, as one of the ‘two hands’ of the Father.38  
While social Trinitarians thereby lay clear emphasis on the distinctness of the 
three persons, they simultaneously expose themselves to charges of tri-theism and incur 
the burden of demonstrating the unity of God’s being, knowledge, will, and actions, 
which the traditional account guarantees.39 In that sense, it is the social Trinitarian rather 
than the Western account which might be said to divorce deus trinus from deus unus. Yet 
social Trinitarians may face even more serious challenges—as I have noted, the very 
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challenges they mounted against the traditional doctrine of the Trinity, albeit on the basis 
of a caricatured conception of it.  
As mentioned above, social doctrines of the Trinity by and large presuppose that 
human, like divine, persons do not subsist prior to but in their relations.40 At first glance, 
this assumption may seem plausible and indeed commendable, since social Trinitarians 
invoke it in order to support equality and diversity, reciprocity, and human collaboration 
and community, and thus to combat the individualism that supposedly plagues the 
traditional doctrine, not to mention modern thought. On closer examination, however, I 
have demonstrated that positing human persons as ‘subsistent relations’ gives way to the 
‘communitarian’ notion that individuals are defined by their social relations.  
In turn, this implies that human beings are a function of their social circumstances 
and the stereotypes that prevail therein, however oppressive or inappropriately restrictive 
they may be.41 Although social doctrines of the Trinity are marketed as a condition for 
social justice, consequently, they ultimately seem to defeat their own purposes of 
fostering healthy ecclesial communities and challenging the patriarchy and oppression 
that are all too common in society as well as in the church.42 On the theoretical level, 
they may even contribute to the problems they purport to solve. By contrast, the 
traditional doctrine possesses resources that have not been sufficiently appreciated for 
achieving the ends of social justice, in virtue of the appropriate distinction it draws 
between the nature of human and divine relations.  
Whereas social Trinitarians generally contend that human beings participate in the 
life of the Trinity by relating to other humans as the persons of the Trinity relate to one 
another, this doctrine suggests that they do so by learning to exercise intellect and will, or 
their abilities and interests to pursue knowledge and to act, just as the Father knows and 
wills to act through the Son and in the Spirit, respectively. In short, they participate by 
embracing and realizing personal potential.43 On this showing, consequently, human 
beings reflect the image of the Trinity, perfectly instanced in Christ, by expressing the 
human spirit (life, mind, personality), given to them through the creative work of the Son, 
out of a desire to honor God the Father as the sole object of absolute significance. This 
desire checks the human tendency to over-estimate the significance of finite objects and 
circumstances in ways that thwart human thriving, and thereby actualizes the God-given 
potential of human beings. 
Since all human persons are made in God’s image to flourish through the 
realization of their potentialities, the traditional doctrine implicitly contests any 
inappropriate power structures or modes of oppression that might prevent this. Contrary 
to popular social Trinitarian belief, consequently, the emphasis on divine unity does not 
“legitimize authoritarian rule by a single holder of exclusive power.”44 This is true 
notwithstanding the use of ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ terminology—and the abuses of this 
terminology to justify patriarchy and oppression, to which many feminist authors have 
objected.45 After all, the activity of ‘generation’ proper to the Father in reality “seems 
much more in keeping with what only women can do: give birth.”46 Regardless, the 
gendered terms can be construed metaphorically and are as such replaceable, even in 
Aquinas’ account, with terms like ‘intellect’ and ‘will’ which refer to powers that all 
persons possess.47 For this reason, they do not denote an intrinsic patriarchy. 
Although the traditional doctrine contests authoritarian and oppressive rule, it 
does not by the same token promote individualism, or an excessive sense of personal 
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autonomy from social relations, which its emphasis on divine unity is frequently accused 
of fostering. For it can be inferred from the traditional doctrine that human individuality, 
like the individuality of the divine persons, is best nurtured in the context of a community. 
That is not to imply that a human community, like that of the divine, can or ought to 
determine the shape of individual personalities, per communitarianism.  
Since human persons do not subsist in their relations, this account merely 
recognizes that communities create a necessary context for employing personal capacities, 
and even a responsibility to do so for the well-being of others; that societies serve at their 
best as a site for encouraging individuals to realize their potential, however this may 
challenge existing stereotypes, structures, and social norms; and that they require to be 
overhauled if they do anything less than operate on precisely these terms of reciprocity 
and equality. In these respects, the traditional doctrine appears to provide a more 
effective theoretical basis for accomplishing the ends of social Trinitarianism than social 
Trinitariansm itself is able to offer.  
As part of the larger project of compensating for the alleged deficiencies of 
Western theology, many social Trinitarians have been concerned not only to correct the 
mistakes of Western Trinitarian thought but also to provide a substitute for the doctrine of 
the one God that precedes’ Aquinas’ account of the Trinity and allegedly renders that 
account superfluous. On the understanding of most social Trinitarians, Aquinas’ decision 
to situate his treatise on the one God just prior to his treatise on the Trinity is not only 
indicative of a practical monotheism. It also confirms that Aquinas adheres to a 
philosophical, some would say ‘onto-theological’ or idolatrous, concept of God. This 
concept is one Aquinas is supposed to have derived from Greek philosophy, in which 
God is conceived as totally impersonal—detached from and unmoved by his creatures.  
Since such a concept of the divine is obviously incompatible with any doctrine of 
the Trinity that acknowledges the personal and loving character of God, many social 
Trinitarians have naturally turned to one or another version of process theology in order 
to affirm God’s nature in these respects. According to process theology, also known in 
some guises as ‘panentheism’ or ‘dialectical theism’48, the one God takes on human 
characteristics like temporality, change, evil, and suffering, even while ‘prehending’ or 
subsuming them all in himself. In this way, he preserves his transcendence, albeit in a 
highly attenuated or qualified way.  
So construed, God is clearly capable of empathizing with the exigencies and even 
the horrors of the human condition. In short, he is fit for personal relationship, in much 
the same way a human person would be capable of relationship. At the same time, 
however, he seems to forfeit the divine qualities on account of which he is able to relate 
to—and help—human beings in ways only God can, indeed, in ways that are highly 
desirable from the human standpoint. For example, the panentheist affirmation of God’s 
mutability seems, if inadvertently, to imply that God can be fickle or fallible with regard 
to his own intents, which would certainly inhibit his ability consistently to work in the 
best interests of his creatures.  
By contrast, the doctrine of divine immutability, which panentheists regard as an 
indicator of utter divine detachment, is in fact a way of asserting God’s unflagging 
faithfulness to his own nature and will to show compassion for his creatures. Likewise, 
the doctrine of divine impassibility, which supposedly renders God ‘unfeeling’, ensures 
that he is never weighed down by sufferings in a way that would prevent him from 
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fulfilling a plan to relieve humanity of theirs, as he would be if he were subject to 
suffering.49 In that sense, the varieties of panentheism that affirm divine suffering seem 
to prove as self-defeating in this respect as the social doctrines of the Trinity to which 
they are often, and quite naturally, allied.50  
For all these reasons, it seems reasonable not only to question the wisdom of the 
recent and wide-scale repudiation of Western theology, but also to query the equally 
widespread tendency of theologians to adopt a combined panentheist-social Trinitarian 
model in its place. When Western theology is interpreted on its own terms, it not only 
avoids the problems panentheist and social Trinitarian theologians have associated with it 
but also proves optimally suited to resolving the very problems and accomplishing the 
ends on account of which such untraditional theological positions have been developed. 
Yet it does so without falling into the pitfalls of these positions, which seemingly “speak 
of God simply by speaking of man in a loud voice.”51 
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